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According to Frans Timmermans, speaking on 17 September 2017, “the situation in
Hungary is not comparable to the situation in Poland” implying that Poland is far worse off
than Hungary in the rule of law department. But is that true?
Timmermans’ diagnosis that Poland is worse than Hungary is surprising considering the
easily available and multiple studies documenting many years of systematic attacks on the
rule of law in Hungary (see for instance this 2016 report from the European Federation for
Human Rights and this 2017 report from the International IDEA in which Hungary is
presented as the archetypal backsliding story).
Timmerman’s argument was also offered a few months after the European Parliament itself
held in a resolution that the “current situation in Hungary represents a clear risk of a serious
breach of the values referred to in Article 2 of the TEU [which] warrants the launch of the
Article 7(1) TEU procedure.”
Hungary’s descent into autocracy under Orbán has been so steep that it is now regularly
described as a semi-authoritarian regime and has now achieved the lowest ranking in the
Central European region in Freedom House’s latest Nations in Transit report (Poland
achieved its lowest point in more than a decade in this same survey but it still ranked higher
than Hungary):
As noted by Dr Christopher Adam, the founding editor of the Hungarian Free Press, “while
Hungary may still be considered “free” by Freedom House standards, its aggregate score
indicates that it is now the “least free” member state of the EU”. Hungary now scores lower
than either Romania and Bulgaria, two Member States that entered the EU under a
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Cooperation and Verification Mechanism that requires ongoing monitoring of the
independence of their judiciaries. But Hungary at present is not subject to monitoring. 
Double standards work in Hungary’s favour.
Despite overwhelming evidence of Hungary’s steep and sustained descent into autocracy
and evidence that Poland is quickly following Hungary’s example (if only because the
Polish ruling party is implementing an “on-steroids” version of Orbán’s constitutional
capture blueprint), the European Commission has so far refused to activate either its Rule
of Law Framework or Article 7(1) TEU vis-à-vis Hungary, while it quickly responded to
Poland’s decline by invoking the Rule of Law Framework in January 2016, only a few short
months after Poland’s PiS government came to power and started wreaking havoc with
constitutionalism. Multiple reasons to justify inaction in the Hungarian case have been
raised over the years and it would be difficult to cite them all here. The two key
justifications, as put forward by Věra Jourová before the European Parliament in December
2015, are that (i) “concerns about the situation in Hungary” can be effectively “addressed
by infringement procedures” and (ii) national “rule of law safeguards” would still be
“capable of effectively addressing” any systemic threats to the rule of law.
These two justifications however can hardly survive a brief Google search.
First, there is no evidence that infringement proceedings have so far prevented to any
meaningful extent Hungary’s transformation into an autocratic mafia state. In fact, Věra
Jourová herself subsequently argued in April 2017, at a time where demonstrations were
taking place in protest against Orbán’s attempts to shut down the Central European
University, that imposing “administrative steps or infringements or other measures” against
the Hungarian government would be unlikely to result in any real change. That was a
position in total contradiction with the one she previously defended before the Parliament in
December 2015 when she expressed faith in infringement procedures as the European
Commission has so far brought them.
By contrast, and secondly, there is a substantial body of evidence that the Hungarian
judiciary’s independence and impartiality have been systematically undermined via forced
retirements and other measures in Hungary (see for instance the report issued by the
International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute in 2015; see also the Grand
Chamber judgment of the ECtHR in the 2016 case of Baka v Hungary). As noted in a
previous paper of ours, it is “ludicrous to believe that the ‘Hungarian justice system’ could
remedy to any serious extent the threats and breaches of EU values identified in the
Parliament’s resolution because the independence and impartiality of the Hungarian
judiciary had already been fatally undermined following repeated and ultimately successful
attempts by Orbán’s ruling party to seize control over the appointment of judges, determine
according to political criteria the viability of individual judge’s careers and seize the process
through which cases were assigned to specific judges”.
So, while Vice-President Timmermans is right to highlight and be worried about the fact that
“today in Poland the constitutionality of legislation can no longer be guaranteed”, the same
can be said of the situation in Hungary. One has just to look at how the Hungarian
Constitutional Court is doing its best not to decide the constitutionality of the so-called Lex
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CEU and Lex NGO (for further analysis, see the posts on this blog of Professors Halmai
and Uitz as well as this study by Professor Bárd). The Court has been reduced to an echo
chamber of the government’s views.
The Commission’s official justifications for its inaction in the Hungarian case therefore lack
credibility.
From a legal point of view, two other reasons – both of which the Commission is reluctant
to admit – appear to explain much of its current denial regarding the situation in Hungary.
First, most of the damage to Hungary’s democratic fabric and national “rule of law
safeguards” is already done and fully entrenched, so undoing the damage is a difficult task.
In Poland, the capture of independent institutions is still underway and might be more easily
halted before the capture is complete.
Secondly, the constitutional coup in Hungary was carried out through the rapid enactment
in 2011 of a new constitution that was specifically designed to speed Hungary’s
transformation into an autocratic one-party state. Hungary’s ruling party, having won a
constitutional majority in the 2010 election, was able to rewrite its national constitution
specifically to permit capture of the Constitutional Court and to enable the speedy
destruction or capture of all possible counter-powers through perfectly legal means. By
contrast, in the absence of the supermajority that would have been necessary to revise the
Polish Constitution, the ruling party there has had to violate the Polish Constitution in order
to achieve its autocratic goals. The Polish government has violated its own constitution
repeatedly and blatantly (for a recent and extremely comprehensive demonstration see this
study by Professor Sadurski), leaving the Commission no choice but to act against its
natural inclination to wait out major problems. The Commission evidently seems more
comfortable pressing a Member State to follow its own laws rather than pressing a Member
State to follow the principles of the EU.
In our view, these two arguments do not excuse the Commission’s failure to do its duty. In
2013, the Tavares report of the European Parliament called on the Commission and the
Council to act decisively while Hungary was still in the middle of its constitutional capture. 
While the Commission occasionally scolded Hungary at that time, the Council did precisely
nothing and the Hungarian juggernaut proceeded without pause. European institutions
should not repeat the same mistake now when faced with repeated attacks against the EU
while Orbán’s relatives benefit from EU-funded contracts and with new legislation targeting
the most internationally well-regarded university in Hungary as well as civil society groups
promoting human rights and transparency. If setting a bad example within the EU is not
enough, Orbán’s policies have since emboldened if not inspired autocratic regimes
worldwide.
It is therefore reasonable to remain unconvinced by the Commission’s legal arguments that
infringement proceedings and national rule of law safeguards are effective or its political
ones that you can have a dialogue with Hungary when it comes to justifying failing to trigger
even the relatively mild pre-Article 7 procedure. When compared to the situation in Poland,
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there is no objective factor which appears to justify inaction on Hungary while the
Commission is active on Poland. At the very least, the rule of law framework should have
been activated to determine whether the situation in Hungary was as bad as that in Poland.
One is forced to conclude that we have here an obvious case of double standards. As
argued by Professors Kelemen and Müller, these double standards can only be explained
by the protection afforded to Orbán by the European’s People Party whose leaders have
repeatedly and shamelessly embraced and protected Orbán over the years.
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